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the basis of three factors: Savino's previous criminal history; the nature
of the crime; and, his history of substance abuse.35 However, when the
defense expert, Dr. Hovermale, was cross-examined by the Common-
wealth, it was revealed that Dr. Centor's report contained statements
made by the defendant. Instead of addressing this fourth factor, evidence
that Dr. Centor was less than truthful about the source of his opinion, the
court simply ignored it. Finally, the court held that even if Dr. Centor's
testimony constituted error, it was harmless, speculating that excluding
Savino's statements would "probably have had little if any effect on Dr.
Centor's assessment.
'36
35 Savino, 82 F.3d at 605.
36 Id. at 605-606.
37 See Case Summary of Payne v. Netherland, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue (where a competency evaluation was used against a
Because the court's analysis of Savino's Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights regarding the use of the Commonwealth's mental health
expert testimony concerning future dangerous is erroneous, defense
counsel must preserve these issues. Unless and until the United States
Supreme Court reverses, counsel must give serious consideration to this
strategy: using a mental health expert but precluding him or her from
testifying at trial, even if the defendant's sanity or competency is in
question.
37
Summary and Analysis by:
C. Cooper Youell, IV
defendant before the enactment of Va Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.) See
also; Collica, Alice in Wonderland Interpretations: Rethinking the Use
of Mental Mitigation Experts, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
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FACTS
In 1984, Lem Tuggle was convicted of capital murder committed
during or subsequent to a rape.1 He was sentenced to death after the jury
found the Commonwealth had proven both the future dangerousness and
vileness aggravating factors. Tuggle's conviction and sentence were
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal.2 The United
States Supreme Court vacated Tuggle's sentence and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of Ake v. Oklahoma,3 which had held that
when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence to prove future
dangerousness, due process requires that an independent psychiatrist
also be appointed to assist the defense.
4
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
had indeed violated Ake by denying Tuggle an independent psychiatrist
to rebut the prosecution's psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness
during the sentencing phase.5 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed Tuggle's death sentence. Relying on Zant v. Stephens,6 the
court reasoned that because the vileness factor was separately found by
the jury in addition to future dangerousness, the vileness factor alone was
sufficient to sustain the sentence.
7
Tuggle subsequently filed and was denied a petition for writ of
certiorari,8 a petition for state habeas relief, and a third petition for
certiorari.9 Tuggle then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in United
States District Court, and the district court granted relief on several
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995).
2 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984)
(Tuggle I).
3 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
4 Id. at 83.
5 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985)
(Tuggle II).
6462 U.S. 862 (1983).
7 Tuggle, 230 Va. at 108-11, 334 S.E.2d at 844-46.
8 Tuggle v. Virginia, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
9 Tuggle v. Bair, 503 U.S. 989 (1992).
grounds, including Ake. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
reversed and remanded, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Virginia
that Tuggle's death sentence was valid underZant.10 The United States
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari and vacated the judgment of
the court of appeals.11 The Supreme Court noted that whileZant had held
that an invalid aggravating circumstance does not always invalidate a
death sentence, the presence of an otherwise valid aggravator cannot
excuse the unconstitutional admission or exclusion of evidence. Thus,
while the Court was willing to assume that theAke error had no influence
upon thejury's finding of"vileness," the Court was not willing to assume
that the Ake constitutional error had no effect on the jury's ultimate
decision on whether to impose a life sentence or the death penalty.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a
determination of whether harmless error analysis was applicable. 12
HOLDING
On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the Ake error was "trial
error," as opposed to structural error, and therefore was subject to
harmless-error analysis. 13 The court of appeals further concluded that
federal habeas courts must apply the Brecht standard of harmlessness,
which requires a court to find that the error had a "substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" before it
can grant relief.
14
10 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1374 (4th Cir. 1995).
11 Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995).
12 Id. at 285.
13 Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1391 (4th Cir. 1996).
14 Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). In Brecht, the
Supreme Court concluded that granting federal collateral relief upon a
mere "reasonable possibility" that the error contributed to the verdict
would be inconsistent with the historic purpose of habeas corpus to
afford relief only to those who have been "grievously wronged" by
society. Id. at 637.
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Applying the Brecht standard to the Ake error in Tuggle, the court
of appeals held that the improper admission of the prosecution expert's
testimony and the trial court's denial to Tuggle of expert psychiatric
assistance did not have a"substantial and injurious effect or influence on
the jury's decision to sentence Tuggle to death," and was thus harmless
error.15 Having determined that the invalid aggravating circumstance
("future dangerousness") was harmless error, the court of appeals again
turned to Zant to uphold the jury's imposition of the death sentence based
upon its independent finding of "vileness." 16
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Applicability of Harmless Error Analysis
In Tuggle, the court of appeals characterized the Ake error as
consisting of both the improper admission of evidence (testimony by the
Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Centor) and the improper exclusion of
evidence (the denial to Tuggle of a defense psychiatric expert). Thus, the
court of appeals viewed Tuggle and Ake as evidence cases, and by so
doing, was able to characterize the improper admission and exclusion of
the evidence as simply trial error subject to harmless-error analysis.
However, Ake is not simply an evidence case. Rather, the deprivation of
a psychiatric expert to Tuggle is better analogized to a deprivation of
counsel, which would constitute structural error, not "trial error." And,
as the United States Supreme Court has held, structural error is not
subject to harmless error analysis.
17
In Ake, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the "basic tools of an
adequate defense" and the "raw materials integral to the building of an
effective defense" in concluding that in certain instances a defense
psychiatric expert is required by due process. 18 The Court emphasized
that the accuracy of the jury's determination, a substantial interest
common to both parties, is "dramatically enhanced" with the appoint-
ment of an expert. 19 Apart from the testimony that a psychiatric expert
can provide, the Court observed that the expert can assist defense counsel
in the cross-examination of the state's psychiatric evidence so that, in
effect, the expert becomes a member of the defense team. In circum-
stances where the error can go to the crux of the jury's decision, Ake
supports the proposition that the deprivation of a psychiatric expert to the
defense rises to the level of deprivation of counsel; thus, Ake error is a
15 Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1396.
16 Interestingly, the court of appeals used the circumstances of
Tuggle in a different case, Middleton v. Evatt, 1996 WL 63038 (unpub-
lished op. referenced at 77 F.3d 469) (4th Cir. 1996), to illustrate how
difficult it can be to find that a valid aggravating circumstance supports
the imposition of the death penalty where other evidence was unconsti-
tutionally admitted. The court of appeals stated in Middleton, "The
circumstances in this case are more like those in Zant than Tuggle
because, even eliminating the rape aggravating factor, one must con-
clude that the death penalty rests on firm ground, namely, the armed
robbery aggravating factor. First, we are not confronted with a situation,
as in Tuggle, where the jury had before it inadmissible evidence....
Second, Middleton, unlike Tuggle, was not precluded from adducing
relevant mitigating evidence." Id. at *6.
Middleton raises its own worries that the court of appeals still has
not gotten the message of Tuggle II in that it never asks the critical
question that the Supreme Court says it must ask: would the evidence
supporting the invalid aggravating circumstance have been properly
admissible in the first place? See case summary of Tuggle II, Capital
Defense Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 1 (1995). But Middleton is also
structural error and should not be subject to harmless error analysis in the
first place.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whetherAke error should
be subject to harmless-error analysis. Although the court of appeals
found that theAke error in Tuggle was "trial error," othercourts have held
that Ake error is "structural error."20 Thus, this issue is not definitively
resolved and defense counsel should continue to argue that Ake error
cannot be subjected to harmless error analysis.
II. The Proper Standard of Harmless Error
Having held that harmless error analysis was applicable, the court
of appeals next had to decide what standard of harmlessness to apply. The
court had two choices: theBrecht or the Chapman21 standard.Brecht sets
a relatively low threshold to find the error was harmless, as reversal will
only be required if the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict."22 Under Chapman, on the
other hand, the error is assessed according to whether it was "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt;" 23 and constitutional error may not be
declared harmless if a "reasonable probability" exists that the "error
contributed to the verdict."24 Thus, the Chapman standard is a much
more difficult standard for the government to meet in proving error was
harmless.
Under Supreme Court precedent, Chapman is the applicable harm-
less-error standard on direct appeal and Brecht is the usual standard on
habeas review. In Brecht, the Supreme Court concluded that granting
federal collateral relief upon a mere "reasonable possibility" that the
error contributed to the verdict (the Chapman standard) would be
inconsistent with the historic purpose of habeas corpus to afford relief
only to those who have been "grievously wronged" by society. 25 The
court of appeals in Tuggle thus held that because the case was on federal
habeas, the appropriate harmless-error standard was the Brecht standard.
The court's automatic reliance on Brecht, however, ignored the reason-
ing behind Brecht and the fact that Tuggle was not the typical case on
federal habeas.
The Supreme Court has taken a number of different approaches to
the re-litigation of issues on direct appeal and collateral attack depending
in part on the constitutional issue. For instance, a defendant cannot re-
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim on federal habeas if he had a full and
troubling in that it suggests that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognizes that Tuggle had a strong claim and yet proceeded in Tuggle
III to characterize it as harmless.
17 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 449 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (holding
that "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism... defy
analysis by harmless-error standards").
18 Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
19 Id. at 83.
20 See Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995). In Rey,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the denial of the
defendant's motion to appoint a pathologist deprived the defendant of a
"basic tool essential to developing and presenting his defensive theory,"
the error was not subject to harmless error review and ordered a new trial
for the defendant. Id. at 345.
21 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
22 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kottkeakos v. UnitedStates, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
23 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
24 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
25 Id.
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fair hearing in state court, 26 while the defendant can raise Miranda and
ineffective assistance claims on federal habeas even if such issues were
already fully and fairly litigated.27 In the context of these approaches,
Brecht can be seen as a compromise decision. In effect, while Brecht still
allows a state prisoner to re-litigate certain issues on federal habeas, it
assumes that because harmless error has already been fully and fairly
litigated in state court, the court can impose a much more difficult
standard for the prisoner to meet in order to receive federal relief. Thus,
the Brecht standard is highly deferential to the state courts because the
Court views the state courts as the most appropriate forum for harmless
error to be fully litigated:
State courts are fully qualified to identify constitutional error
and evaluate its prejudicial effect on the trial process under
Chapman, and state courts often occupy a superior vantage
point from which to evaluate the effect of trial error. For these
reasons, it scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas
courts to engage in the identical approach to harmless-error
review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on
direct review.
28
But while theBrecht standard may make sense where the state court
has already found harmless error under Chapman, its reasoning had no
application in Tuggle's case: in Tuggle, there never was a full and fair
26 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that when a
Statehas given afull andfairchance to litigateFourth Amendment claim,
federal habeas relief is not available to state prisoner alleging that his
conviction rests on evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search
or seizure).
27 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (holding that
Stone's restriction on exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction does not
extend to state prisoner's claim that his conviction rests on statements
obtained in violation of safeguards mandated byMiranda v.Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)); Kimmelman v.Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (declin-
ing to extend Stone to bar habeas review of certain claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Sixth Amendment); Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (1979) (denying request to apply Stone to bar habeas consider-
ation of Fourteenth Amendment due process claim of insufficient evi-
dence to support state conviction); and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979) (refusing to extend Stone to foreclose habeas review of equal
protection claim of racial discrimination in selecting state grand-jury
foreman).
28 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636 (citations omitted).
29 See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (holding that
United States Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from
upholding a death sentence that is based in part on invalid or improperly
applied aggravating circumstance, so long as the appellate court either
reweighs aggravating or mitigating evidence or conducts harmless error
review, and remanding to the state appellate court to make such a
determination). See also Stringer v.Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (holding
that use of vague or imprecise aggravating factor in weighing process
invalidates sentence and at very least requires constitutional harmless
error analysis or reweighing in state judicial system); Sochor v. Florida,
hearing in the state courts during which the error was analyzed according
to the Chapman standard. Likewise, while the Supreme Court has
allowed state appellate courts to salvage a death sentence under Zant's
harmless-error analysis, it has always required the state appellate court
to first re-weigh the remaining valid aggravating factors with the mitigat-
ing factors. 29 Because the Supreme Court of Virginia relied on Zant to
salvage the death sentence without re-weighing the sentence and never
applied Chapman,30 Brecht's core rationale--deferring to the state's
finding of harmless error under Chapman except where clearly errone-
ous-simply has no place; there was no state decision to which to defer.
Consequently, the court of appeals should have used the Chapman
standard, not the Brecht standard, to decide whether the Ake error was
harmless.
31
As a result, the court's decision to apply the Brecht standard in
assessing the Ake error in Tuggle was an arbitrary one. If the Supreme
Court of Virginiahad correctly concluded on direct appeal thatAke error
had occurred, it would have been required to apply Chapman. The
court's application of Brecht thus perversely rewards the state court for
getting the law wrong and erroneously affirming the death sentence
when, in fact, it should have found error and been bound by Chapman.
The decision of the court of appeals, therefore, was fundamentally unfair
to Tuggle, as he never received the benefit of Chapman's lower standard
for harmless-error analysis.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
504 U.S. 527 (1992) (emphasizing that in considering a death sentence
where sentencer has unconstitutionally applied an invalid aggravating
circumstance, reviewing state court must either independently re-weigh
the factors or apply harmless error analysis to constitutional flaw);
Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S.Ct. 528 (1992) (concluding that at a minimum,
where death sentence has been infected by vague or otherwise constitu-
tionally invalid factor, state appellate court or some other state sentencer
must actually perform new sentencing calculus if new sentence is to
stand).
30 Because the Supreme Court of Virginiahas neverheld that under
state law it has the power to independently re-weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors, its only option may have been to apply Chapman.
31 The court of appeals presumably could have remanded Tuggle
to the state courts for a proper determination of whether theAke error was
harmless according to Chapman. In applying the Brecht standard to
Tuggle, the court of appeals cited its own precedent in Correll v.
Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279 (4thCir. 1995) and Smith v.Dixon, 14F.3d 956
(4th Cir. 1994) to support the proposition thatBrecht, and not Chapman,
should apply on habeas review. Like Tuggle, the state appellate court in
Smith did not conduct a Chapman harmless-error analysis, and the court
of appeals conducted a Brecht harmless-error analysis. However, in
Correll, there was a hearing conducted in the state court on the issue at
hand, and the court of appeals then applied a Brecht harmless-error
analysis. Similarly, in Middleton v. Evatt, 1996 WL 63038 (4th Cir.
1995), the court of appeals applied a Brecht harmless error analysis only
after the Supreme Court of South Carolina had re-weighed the issues.
Thus, the court of appeals seems mistakenly poised to apply the Brecht
standard to any issue on habeas review, regardless of whether the state
court has applied harmless error.
